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Abstract: This paper describes a supervisor system for monitoring the operation of automated 
agricultural vehicles. The system analyses all of the information provided by the sensors and 
subsystems on the vehicles in real time and notifies the user when a failure or potentially 
dangerous situation is detected. In some situations, it is even able to execute a neutralising 
protocol to remedy the failure. The system is based on a distributed and multi-level architecture 
that divides the supervision into different subsystems, allowing for better management of the 
detection and repair of failures. The proposed supervision system was developed to perform 
well in several scenarios, such as spraying canopy treatments against insects and diseases 
and selective weed treatments, by either spraying herbicide or burning pests with a 
mechanical-thermal actuator. Results are presented for selective weed treatment by the 
spraying of herbicide. The system successfully supervised the task; it detected failures such 
as service disruptions, incorrect working speeds, incorrect implement states, and potential 
collisions. Moreover, the system was able to prevent collisions between vehicles by taking 
action to avoid intersecting trajectories. The results show that the proposed system is a highly 
useful tool for managing fleets of autonomous vehicles. In particular, it can be used to 
manage agricultural vehicles during treatment operations. 
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1. Introduction 
The use of robotic agricultural machinery to automate agricultural tasks is close to becoming a reality. 
Automation is a promising step forward that can increase farming productivity due to the potentially 
high performance of these platforms relative to human labour. For this reason, there has been a 
significant amount of research in this field in recent years. For example, many advances have been made 
to achieve autonomous navigation in agricultural vehicles, mainly by using GPS [1–3] and computer 
vision [4,5]. Implements (actuation systems) have also been automated to work selectively and more 
efficiently. For example, spraying bars integrated with RTK-GPS can now spray selectively with high 
precision [6], and mechanical-thermal actuators can now burn weeds with high accuracy and correct 
intensity [7] by detecting the positions and densities of weed patches using cameras installed on the 
vehicles (ground perception systems) [8–10] or using cameras installed on aerial vehicles (remote 
perception systems) [11–14]. One important step forward in agricultural automation has been carried out 
by the RHEA project [15–17]. RHEA developed new ways to use automatic systems in agriculture and 
forestry by proposing a fleet of small, heterogeneous and cooperative robots (unmanned ground vehicles, 
UGVs, and unmanned aerial vehicles, UAVs) equipped with advanced perception systems, improved 
implements and enhanced decision-making algorithms to effectively accomplish agricultural tasks, such 
as chemical and physical control of weeds in crops or pesticide application in woody crops. 
Once a task can be automatically executed, it is extremely important to determine whether it does not 
advance as it was planned as soon as possible and then to accurately identify the causes of the failure. 
Much of the machinery used in agriculture is heavy and mobile, and therefore, performing a task without 
human staff and delegating the responsibility to machines is an operation that may be extremely 
dangerous. In addition, the inherent uncertainty related to a changing and partially unpredictable working 
environment (e.g., weather, people working nearby, uneven ground, animals that can appear suddenly) 
makes it more difficult to maintain safe conditions for equipment, people and the crop itself. 
Consequently, setting up automation to provide the necessary quality is a complex task. 
Saffiotti [18] identifies three different strategies to reduce the effects of uncertainty on autonomous 
systems: (1) eliminating uncertainty; (2) reasoning about uncertainty; and (3) tolerating uncertainty. 
Some of the uncertainty can be eliminated by using better hardware, such as high-precision machines 
and sophisticated sensors; however, this strategy increases the cost of the platforms. Engineering the 
environment can also reduce the uncertainty. For example, artificial landmarks or fixed tracks in the 
ground can be used. However, this solution reduces both the flexibility and robustness of the agricultural 
vehicles (for example, the landmarks could be hidden by obstacles). Moreover, there are some sources 
of uncertainty that cannot be eliminated by engineering the environment. For example, human actions 
cannot always be predicted. Therefore, reasoning appears to be the best option to address uncertainty; 
however, it requires more complex models that are not always easy to obtain; in some cases, it is even 
impossible to obtain these models. Nevertheless, reasoning does not necessarily increase the robustness 
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of the execution because no amount of reasoning can obtain missing information. For example, a robot 
can guess what is behind a closed door but cannot truly know before the door is opened. Therefore, the 
only useful strategy to act robustly in a partially unknown and dynamic world is to tolerate uncertainty, 
i.e., an autonomous platform must be prepared to handle problems during the execution of a task. This 
approach leads to a type of supervisor system that is able to monitor the execution of a task, control the 
effects of uncertainty and report to the operator in charge when something is not working as expected. 
The majority of such supervisor systems have two main functionalities: fault detection and fault 
diagnosis [19]. The first functionality detects when something goes wrong, and the second functionality 
classifies what is going wrong and assesses the magnitude of the fault. Chiang et al. [20] list three types 
of monitoring approaches for these systems: analytical, data-driven and knowledge-based approaches. 
Analytical approaches use mathematical models of the system and have two main stages. In the first 
stage, the measurable inputs and outputs of the system are compared with a model that describes the 
relationship between the system variables in exact mathematical terms. Any inconsistency in this 
relationship will indicate a fault in the system. In the second stage, whether a fault has occurred is 
determined by examining the inconsistencies detected. Analytical approaches are preferable when the 
system to be monitored is well understood and the uncertainty is limited. However, mathematical models 
of the system are not always available; in many complex systems, it is difficult or impossible to obtain 
them. This is the main weakness of the approach, which is already implemented in several supervisors 
that have been developed for autonomous mobile platforms [21–23]. 
In contrast, data-driven approaches do not require an analytical model of the system, and the 
information used for fault detection and diagnosis is derived directly from the input data. The  
decision-making process is often based on statistical methods. Modern industrial systems (entire 
industrial plants) and autonomous robotic systems are large-scale systems, with heavy instrumentation 
that produces an extremely large amount of data. Data-driven approaches [24–26] have the ability to 
transform high-dimensional data into lower-dimension space while preserving the essential information. 
By computing statistical measures, the supervision can be improved significantly in large-scale systems; 
however, the performance depends greatly on the quality and amount of the input data. Some examples 
of mobile robot supervisors based on data-driven approaches can be found in the literature [25,26]. 
Finally, the aim of a knowledge-based strategy is to simulate the behaviour of an expert when  
solving problems and tasks. In a supervising context, the main opportunity of using knowledge-based 
approaches is to have the capacity to build hybrid supervision systems by combining analytical and  
data-driven approaches. As in the other strategies, some examples for unmanned vehicles can be found 
in the literature [27,28]. 
This paper describes a complex supervisor system developed to monitor a fleet of automated vehicles 
performing agricultural tasks. In some cases, the proposed supervisor responds to the analytical approach 
explained above, whereas in other cases, it is clearly based on a knowledge-based approach. The system 
is based on a multi-level architecture with multiple supervisors working in parallel and on different 
supervision levels. A first level is contained inside the equipment on the vehicles and is used to address 
critical and urgent failures, whereas a second and higher level covers the less pressing failures and 
addresses unexpected situations that involve several vehicles at the same time, e.g., a collision between 
two or more vehicles. 
Sensors 2015, 15 5405 
 
 
In addition to fault detection and fault diagnosis, the system proposed in this paper integrates a third 
functionality: fault recovery to repair some of the faults detected. The system was tested within the 
RHEA project scenarios by performing real agricultural tasks. The tasks were supervised for several 
tests, and the system was able to detect various irregular and dangerous situations, such as tractor  
out-of-track positions, inappropriate working speeds, incorrect states, malfunctioning implements, 
unopened spraying nozzles, and malfunctioning sensors on the vehicle. The supervisor was also able to 
solve some of the problems by using the integrated fault recovery module. 
2. The Proposed Supervision Approach 
First, it is important to define several concepts, such as mission, alarm and supervisor, to understand 
the proposed approach. The mission is the agricultural task that a fleet must carry out, and it is mainly 
composed of a plan with the expected trajectories for each unit, the speeds of each unit and the state that 
the implements must have in each point of the trajectories. For example, in a spraying bar case,  
the implement may need to be activated or deactivated, or a nozzle of the bar may need to be opened or 
closed. The alarm is the notification generated when a failure is detected, such as an inappropriate speed, 
a vehicle out of track or an incorrect nozzle state. For example, in the higher supervision level, in addition 
to failures, an alarm can also signal important events, such as the accomplishment of a trajectory or the 
successful initiation of a device. Throughout the document, most of the alarms explained are related to 
failures, and those that do not refer to malfunctions are explicitly indicated. Finally, a supervisor is the 
module or piece of code that analyses the information periodically received from the items to be 
supervised (concrete devices, such as engines, tanks, nozzles, and sensors, or conceptual elements, such 
as trajectories and collisions), generating an alarm if a failure or important event is detected. In the 
proposed approach, a supervisor mainly consists of a set of IF-THEN rules that generate alarms when 
the information collected meets certain conditions. In general, the inputs of a supervisor can be expressed 
as a pair (property, value), where property indicates the entity to be supervised and value indicates its 
current state. Supervisors produce several types of alarms, but in general, supervisors in the higher levels 
generate more types of alarms than those at lower levels because they supervise more complex 
components and have to consider a more diverse set of failures and important events. 
The proposed supervision architecture is distributed over different physical subsystems, taking advantage 
of the distributed nature of a fleet of tractors working together in agricultural tasks. The supervision can 
be performed inside the units themselves or can be carried out in an external computer that monitors the 
entire fleet and is accessible to the operator. In other words, supervision is separated into different levels, 
which are explained below. 
2.1. Supervision Levels 
The first level of supervision includes all of the elemental supervisors running on computers installed 
in the vehicles. In other words, each elemental supervisor is part of the Unit Control System (UCS) of 
each vehicle (see Figure 1). At this level, supervisors generate alarms when they detect faults on the 
onboard subsystems or directly receive alarms from them. Alarms that contain identification codes are 
generated when specific faulty situations are detected. In some cases, the faults can be solved by the 
subsystem or by the supervisor on the vehicle. The alarms are always sent to the upper levels, even when 
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the detected fault is repaired inside the vehicle. This procedure is necessary because alarms with a low 
risk can occasionally be significant if they are combined with other alarms. Therefore, they have to be 
raised to upper levels to be analysed from the perspective of the entire system. 
Supervisors in the mobile units can detect, diagnose and repair a fault. Thus, the first level of 
supervision performs the three main supervision functions. In addition to the alarm, the ground units 
send periodic monitoring messages to the second level, external to them, reporting about the status of 
the vehicle. In the proposed architecture, the second level is divided into three main modules: (1) the 
Mission Supervisor; (2) the Fault Recovery Module; and (3) the Alarm Notification Manager. The Mission 
Supervisor processes all of the information provided by the tractors, including both the alarms and 
monitoring messages, during the execution of the agricultural task (mission), and it detects and diagnoses 
more complex faults that involve more than one unit, more than one alarm, or unexpected vehicle behaviour. 
This module also propagates the old and new alarms to the Fault Recovery Module and Alarm Notification 
Manager. The Fault Recovery Module receives the alarms generated by the Mission Supervisor and uses 
a pre-established protocol to find the action needed to address the fault. At this level, the Mission 
Supervisor performs fault detection and fault diagnosis, and the Fault Recovery Module performs fault 
recovery. Finally, the Alarm Notification Manager is a policy system that decides whether an alarm 
needs to be sent to the third level of supervision. This decision is based on a set of policies that consider 
the priority and severity of the alarm. 
 
Figure 1. Distributed multi-level supervision. 
The third level, the operator level, is related to the graphical user interface (GUI). It is used to convey 
information to the operator in charge of mission supervision. With the approach proposed, the operator 
receives a sufficient amount of information, generated in the lower levels, to keep track of mission 
performance. The operator is the final decision element of the proposed supervision architecture. In fact, 
if something does not work as expected, the operator can take control of the fleet and directly change 
the guidelines of mission execution. Thus, even at this level, the three main supervision functionalities, 
i.e., fault detection, fault diagnosis and fault recovery, can be carried out. The Mission Supervisor, as 
well as the Fault Recovery Module and Alarm Notification Manager, are explained in detail in  
Sections 2.2–2.4. 
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2.2. Mission Supervisor 
In the proposed approach (see Figure 2), the Mission Supervisor consists of a set of individual 
supervisors working together to manage different items.  
 
Figure 2. Supervision architecture. The rounded rectangles represent supervisors at different 
levels, and the arrows represent their inputs and outputs, alarms and monitoring information. 
The information is provided by the supervisors that are installed on the tractors. 
For example, one supervisor monitors the speed of the unit, another supervisor monitors the 
trajectory, and so on. In this manner, the mission supervision is distributed across different levels: basic, 
unit and fleet levels. Thus, it is possible to execute only certain supervisors (if desired) or to update one 
of them easily without affecting the others. Moreover, by dividing and properly combining individual 
supervisors, complex behaviour can emerge from the Mission Supervisor, as will be described later. The 
supervisors of the basic level receive only the information associated with a specific property that can 
be related to a physical entity, such as a nozzle or sensor, or a conceptual item, such as a trajectory. 
Consequently, the property supervisors contain only the logic to detect the failures related to their 
associated properties. At the unit level, supervisors detect higher-level failures that arise from different 
properties of the same unit. For example, when more than one nozzle does not work, they can detect that 
situation. Finally, at the fleet level, supervisors detect anomalies pertaining to the behaviour of the entire 
fleet, such as a collision of several units. 
In addition to the information provided by vehicles, the supervisors can also access mission data, such 
as the defined trajectories for each of the units, their speeds, and the states of the implements. This 
information is static; it does not change during mission execution. It is established for each supervisor 
at the beginning of the mission. 
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The internal logic of the supervisor modules encapsulates the fault detection functionality required 
for any supervision system. The fault diagnosis functionality is encapsulated in the alarms because the 
types of alarms issued by the supervisors determine the types of failures. 
With this approach, the supervision behaviour is clearly decoupled because each supervisor 
encapsulates part of the logic of the supervision and the supervisors can all be easily replaced. Moreover, 
the approach is also hierarchical because it allows the supervisors to link to each other and build more 
complex supervisors that perform supervision at different levels. By combining decoupling and hierarchy, 
any supervision system built with this approach can be easily adapted and updated to provide new 
supervision functions. 
2.3. Fault Recovery Module 
The Fault Recovery Module is the module in charge of neutralising the failures reported by the alarms. 
Thus, this module encapsulates the fault recovery functionality. It receives the alarms issued by the 
Mission Supervisor and refers to a database to determine the strategy that must be executed to counteract 
the alarm. The strategy consists of a set of actions to be executed by the UCS. For example, if a collision 
of several units is predicted, the neutralising strategy may be to stop the units to avoid the collision. In 
general, the strategies can involve one or more actions that must be executed by the UCS. Such actions 
may include reducing the speed, restarting the mission, and changing the pressure of a nozzle. 
2.4. Alarm Notification Manager 
The Alarm Notification Manager is a policy system that decides which of the received alarms  
should be sent to the operator (level 3) according to a set of policies. This allows alarms to be filtered in 
certain situations. As an example, consider the case of a “pilot flame” alarm in a mechanical-thermal 
tool. Such tools are able to use flames to remove weeds from fields [7]. In this type of implement, the 
pilot flame may become extinguished many times (due to wind or other causes). The fault can be detected 
and repaired by the onboard actuation system of the tractor, which is able to reignite the pilot flame 
repeatedly. However, it is possible that a larger problem will occur that only can be detected at higher 
levels of supervision, such as the Mission Supervisor. This may occur when the alarm is permanently 
active, for example. In this case, a revision of the tool operation is required, and therefore, the 
farmer/operator must be notified (level 3) by an alarm generated at level 2 related to the larger problem. 
The operator need not be notified of the minor alarms generated by the onboard actuation system of the 
vehicle. This strategy helps to generate alarms in a timely manner without overwhelming the operator 
with excessive, distracting messages. For completeness, a log of all alarms generated during the mission 
is stored so that the operator can review it after the mission as needed. 
3. Characteristics of the Fleet to Be Supervised 
A fleet of vehicles with the architecture of the RHEA European project [29] was used to test the 
proposed supervision approach. Figure 3 shows the RHEA architecture. Aside from the vehicles, there 
is a base station that contains a main computer to remotely manage the fleet and execute other agricultural 
services, such as generating a weed map from aerial images taken by UAVs or generating the plan that 
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the ground units will use to move during the mission. This computer executes the supervision levels 
external to the UCS, that is, levels 2 and 3 (Figure 1). It is a desktop computer with motherboard ASUS 
Z87-K SK1150/PCX 3.0, Intel core i7 4771 3.5 GHZ CPU, 2 DDR3 1600 8 GB PC3-12800 modules  
(16 GB RAM), and SSD with 240 GB. The power of these features was sufficient for operating the 
Mission Supervisor, the Fault Recovery Module, the Alarm Notification Manager and additional 
software, such as the operator GUI to display the supervision outputs. 
 
Figure 3. RHEA architecture. 
The RHEA fleet contains three autonomous tractors that can be configured to use different 
implements. Each vehicle is based on a restructured medium New Holland Boomer 3050 (50 hp,  
1270 kg), in which the cabin has been reduced to leave just sufficient room for the computer equipment 
required for the perception, actuation, location, communication, and safety systems. Other equipment 
has been integrated outside of the cabin, such as an RGB camera, a laser, three antennas (two for the 
GPS receiver and one for communications), emergency lights and bottoms, a fuel cell and a solar panel 
placed on top of the vehicle. Figure 4 shows the three units that were developed, as well as the perception 
systems and implements. 
In the following sections, the different types of equipment on the tractors are presented, with special 
attention to the information needed by the supervisor system to monitor the performance of the units 
during the mission. 
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Figure 4. RHEA fleet: (1) Perception systems; (2) sprayer boom; (3) mechanical-thermal 
tool; (4) air-blast sprayer; and (5) unit controller. 
3.1. Perception Equipment 
Each vehicle in the fleet is equipped with several sensors to detect changes in the environment. The 
details have been previously described [30]; however, a brief summary is given below. The vehicles 
have four main sensors: an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), a camera, an RTK-GPS receiver and a 
Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR) system. 
The IMU is a 3DM-GX3®-35 high-performance model miniature Attitude Heading Reference System 
(AHRS) developed by LORD MicroStrain® Sensing Systems (Cary, NC, USA), that provides the pitch 
and roll angles of the vehicles. The camera is a SVS4050CFLGEA model from SVS-VISTEK (Seefeld, 
Germany) and is built with the CCD Kodak KAI 04050M/C sensor with a GR Bayer colour filter; it 
provides high-resolution images (2336 by 1752 pixels with a 5.5 by 5.5 μm pixel size) to accurately 
determine the locations of the weeds and crop lines. Because the agricultural tasks are typically carried 
out under bad weather conditions that can damage electronics, the camera and IMU are placed inside a 
housing unit with a fan controlled by a thermostat for cooling purposes. This allows them to work even 
when it is raining or when the temperature is above 50 °C. Both devices are also sufficiently robust to 
continue working in real time even in the face of vibrations produced by the vehicles when moving 
through the field. 
The RTK-GPS receiver on each tractor is a Trimble BX982 GNSS receiver; a multi-channel,  
multi-frequency OEM GNSS receiver that enables OEM and system integrators to rapidly integrate 
centimetre-level positioning and precise headings into their applications. Moreover, a dual-antenna input 
system is also integrated to accurately determine the heading of the vehicles; this system exceeds the 
performance of a single-antenna GNSS system. A single-antenna system would have difficulty determining 
where the antenna is positioned relative to the vehicle and object of interest, especially when the 
dynamics are low. Thus, the BX982 supports two antennas connected to the board by using dual chips. 
The independent observations from both antennas are passed to the processor, where multi-constellation 
RTK baselines are computed and compared with the positions provided by both antennas. As the real 
physical distance and their positions on the vehicle are known, it is possible to calculate the vehicle’s 
heading with high accuracy. Therefore, a single connection to the tractor receiver via RS232, USB, 
Ethernet or CAN delivers both centimetre-accuracy positions and a heading that is accurate to less than 
a tenth of a degree (2 m baseline). In this manner, both the position and heading of the vehicles are 
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provided with high precision. The RTK-GPS receivers can report the vehicle’s current position with a 
relative accuracy of 0.008 + 1 ppm (parts per million) in the horizontal plane, which is always below  
2 cm, and a maximum frequency of 20 Hz. 
Finally, the vehicles are also equipped with a LiDAR sensor to detect obstacles as an additional 
security safety system in case the supervisor system does not detect them. The LiDAR sensor used was 
model LMS 111 (SICK AG, Waldkirch, Germany). It was installed on the middle of the vehicle’s front 
with a push–broom configuration (4° inclination) and was used to detect obstacles along the vehicle 
trajectory with a ground clearance of 70 cm). 
3.2. Implements 
An implement is a device designed to perform an action on a crop. In a precision agriculture  
scheme, some elements on the implements can be operated independently, and PLCs and computers are 
used to control them and coordinate their actions with the vehicle. To date, in the RHEA project,  
the following three implements have been developed: a sprayer boom, a mechanical-thermal tool and an 
air-blast sprayer. 
The herbicide tool is integrated [31] by a 6-m spray boom that is divided into 12 sections, which can 
be independently activated, and 2 tanks. The main tank has a capacity of 200 L, and the secondary tank 
has a Direct Injection System (DIS) that allows the chemicals to be injected directly at the end of the 
bar, avoiding mixing of the herbicides with water in the main tank before the treatment application. With 
the DIS, it is possible to recover excess herbicide, which provides important environmental and economic 
advantages. Both tanks are supplied with optical sensors that check the liquid volume in the tank. 
The mechanical-thermal equipment is devoted to weed control in flame-resistant crops, such as maize, 
onion, and garlic. The implement consists of a mechanical tool for removing weeds that have grown in 
the inter-row space and a burn system to perform selective and accurate burning in the rows [7,32]. The 
mechanical actions are continuously performed, independent of the presence of weeds; in contrast, the 
thermal treatment is performed only for the weeds that appear in the crop rows. Thus, the treatment 
system must be attached to a weed detection system. In the RHEA project, this system has been 
developed to process the RGB images acquired with a camera on the tractor in real time [30,33,34]. The 
pressure of the liquefied petroleum gas (LPG, the fuel source for the burners) is adjusted according to 
weed cover; two levels of pressure have been defined. 
The air-blast sprayer for pesticide applications in olive trees consists of two main vertical columns 
that support two sets of nozzles. The upper and lower nozzles in each column can rotate in the range  
of 0°–30° to adjust the spray direction to the canopy size. The two central nozzles in each column are 
static. Each nozzle has an associated ultrasonic sensor that turns on (off) the nozzle if it detects (does not 
detect) an object in front of the working range of the nozzle. In addition, the upper (lower) nozzles move 
down (up) if they do not detect an obstacle in the working range [35,36]. This implement was used in the 
RHEA project to spray olive trees; thus, it is assumed that the potential obstacles are the olive tree canopies. 
3.3. Other Devices 
The tractors are equipped with an onboard computer that runs the UCS. A CompactRIO model 9082 
from National Instruments (Austin, TX, USA) was selected due to its high-performance multicore 
Sensors 2015, 15 5412 
 
 
system for intense embedded monitoring and control applications. It has a 1.33 GHz dual-core Intel Core 
i7 processor, 32 GB of nonvolatile storage and 2 GB of DDR3 800 MHz RAM. It also includes a LX150 
FPGA for custom I/O timing, control and processing. 
4. The Implemented Supervision System 
This section describes the main characteristics of the Supervision System (Mission Supervisor, Fault 
Recovery Module and Operator GUI) implemented for RHEA based on the proposed approach. The 
outputs of the UCS, i.e., the alarms and monitoring messages, are listed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.  
Table 1. UCS alarms. 
Producer System Alarm Type Description 
Unit Control 
System (UCS) 
Critical mainboard temperature 
The system needs to cool down to prevent damage to the 
communication system hardware 
Critical CPU temperature 
The system needs to cool down to prevent damage to the 
communication system hardware 
Critical RAM storage level 
Alarm related to the logging and monitoring functionalities, 
indicating possible loss of data 
Application traffic logging error Application traffic logging failed 
Communication synchronisation 
error (GPS time) 
Synchronisation to global GPS time failed. Thus, there is no 
common knowledge of system time 
Vehicle 
Mission aborted: Unit not moving The unit cannot move due to some internal error 
Mission aborted: Unit stopped The unit was stopped successfully by external request 
Mission finished The mission sent to the unit was executed successfully 
TPH is not moving Three point hitch (TPH) is not moving 
Error in set/unset PTO The power take-off (PTO) value could not be set 
Set/Unset implement error The implement could not be set 
Sprayer boom 
Main tank volume critical The level of the main tank is very low 
DIS tank volume critical The level of the Direct Injection System (DIS) tank is very low 
Impossible to adjust main flow The main flow could not be set 
Herbicide line blocked The herbicide line is blocked 
Boom is opening or closing Boom is opening or closing 
Impossible to adjust boom opening The boom could not be opened 
Start/Stop failure The implement was not started/stopped successfully 
Change nozzles failure The nozzles could not be set properly 
Open/close Boom failure The implement was not opened/closed successfully 
Set main flow failure The main flow value could not be set 
Set DIS flow failure The Direct Injection System (DIS) flow value could not be set 
Flaming tool 
Bottle empty The LPG bottle is empty 
Start/Stop failure The implement was not started/stopped successfully 
Change burners failure The burners could not be set properly 
Air-blast sprayer 
No flow in main line There is no flow in the main line 
Tank level critical The level of the pesticide tank is very low 
US sensor not working The ultrasonic sensor (US) is not providing information 
Start/Stop failure The implement was not started/stopped successfully 
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Table 2. UCS monitoring information. 
Producer System Message Type Description 
Vehicle 
Controller 
Indicates the state of the internal controller: e.g., disabled, ready, manual or 
executing a moving operation, paused, or stopped. 
Motion Provides the GPS position, the speed, the heading and the PTO and hitch states. 
Flaming  
Implement Indicates the state of the implement (ON/OFF) 
Burners Reports the state of the burner pressure (OFF/Low/High) 
Sprayer boom 
Implement Indicates the state of the implement (ON/OFF) 
Nozzles Reports the state of the valves in the spraying bar (ON/OFF) 
Air-blast sprayer Implement Indicates the state of the implement (ON/OFF) 
The Alarm Notification Manager sends all alarms to the operator except the free path alarms in this 
version of the Supervision System. 
4.1. Mission Supervisor 
The Basic Level contains the supervisors that directly manage the information provided by each UCS. 
These supervisors monitor the speed, trajectory, service disruptions, implement states and remaining 
mission status (see Table 3). In particular, the speed supervisor receives the current speed and position 
of each vehicle (both provided by the RTK-GPS receiver) and periodically verifies that the received 
speed matches the expected working speed (within a certain margin of tolerance), which was previously 
set according to the task’s specifications. An alarm is generated when they do not match. Similarly, the 
out-of-track supervisor periodically checks whether the current position of the unit matches the expected 
position based on the mission trajectory, and it produces an alarm whenever a point is missed or is visited 
out of order. The position accuracy and frequency (2 cm and 20 Hz, respectively) of the RTK-GPS 
receivers guarantee that a vehicle cannot move far without being detected by the supervisor. The service 
disruption supervisor periodically checks the most recent time that a sensor or internal system has 
provided its information. If some critical time threshold is exceeded, a service disruption alarm is issued. 
The overall system supervises moving medium-size tractors, and thus, it is essential to receive critical 
information, such as the tractor position, with the appropriate frequency. The implement state supervisor 
verifies the state of the actuators in the onboard tractor implements and generates an alarm if an 
unexpected state is found. The remaining mission supervisor generates an informational message 
whenever it receives the vehicle location (UTM coordinates), and the message includes details about the 
remaining percentage of the mission. This message cannot be considered an alarm because it does not 
represent a malfunction in the system. It is useful to notify the operator about the percentage of the 
mission remaining at any time. 
In the current version of the implemented Supervision System, the Unit Level encapsulates all of the 
supervision associated with a unit by bringing together all of the alarms related to it. Therefore, this level 
contains as many supervisors as there are units in the fleet. Thus, in the proposed approach, the basic 
level supervisors are simple. They separately detect minimal deviations, and by working together, they 
form a powerful tool that covers a wide range of situations. 
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Table 3. Basic-level supervisor alarms. 
Supervisor Alarm Description 
Speed Wrong Speed The unit is not moving at the expected speed. 
Out of Track  Wrong Position The unit is not at the expected location. 
Service Disruption Service Disruption 
A service (such as a sensor or subsystem) has not provided information 
within the required time. 
Implement State Wrong Implement State The implement is not in the expected state (e.g., a nozzle is not opened) 
Remaining Mission 
Remaining Mission 
Percentage 
The percentage of the mission that remains, which is included in the 
message as a variable. 
Finally, three of the supervisors are contained in the Fleet Level: the collision supervisor, mission 
completed supervisor and fleet supervisor. They generate the alarms listed in Table 4. The collision 
supervisor detects potential collisions by analysing the positions of all units in the fleet and their  
planned trajectories. The supervisor works in two steps: (1) Given a distance threshold, the supervisor 
checks two by two to determine whether the units are close each other. If the threshold is exceeded, then 
an alarm is generated. If the threshold is not exceeded, the supervisor looks for the current positions of 
the units inside the planned trajectories and calculates where they will be in the near future by advancing 
them incrementally according to the plan. The positions are advanced by small time intervals that 
guarantee the detection of trajectory intersections and the production of appropriate alarms. An increment 
of time between 0.5 and 1 s was experimentally determined to be sufficient for the given unit size and 
the expected maximum speed, which is approximately 6 km/h in herbicide treatment tasks. The security 
area of the units is defined by considering the real dimensions of the unit and an additional security 
distance that is dependent on the vehicle speed: a faster unit will have a longer security boundary as the 
braking time is highly dependent on the vehicle speed. The current positions (and thus their areas) are 
advanced incrementally until some maximum time. The value of the maximum time was defined to allow 
sufficient time to perform the following set of actions before a collision actually takes place: detecting 
the collision, alerting the operator and letting him act, if needed. In addition to the alarm, the collision 
alarms contain extra information, such as the identification of the involved units and the collision risk 
level (low, medium or high), which is calculated according to the remaining time to collision: the lower 
is the amount of remaining time, the higher is the risk. 
Because of the criticality of a collision situation, it is essential to link these alarms to neutralising 
actions that counteract the damage as quickly as possible. The Fault Recovery Module is the piece of the 
Supervision System devoted to determining the most appropriate action to counter an alarm. In the case 
of a collision, a possible neutralising action can consist of pausing one of the units involved in the 
collision. In general, this action is sufficient to avoid a collision. However, there are some special cases 
in which both units must be paused, such as if they are approaching each other by following the same 
path in opposite directions. Furthermore, when one or more vehicles have been paused, they should be 
resumed once the risk has been overcome. Thus, it is necessary to detect when the path is free again for 
the paused units. The collision supervisor is also in charge of checking the status of the path by following 
a procedure similar to the one used to detect a collision. The current position of the unit is obtained, and 
whether the area of the unit will overlap the area of another unit in the near future is determined by 
incrementally updating the positions of the fleet. If no collision is detected, then an alarm is issued 
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reporting that the path is free. The mission completed supervisor receives the remaining mission alarms 
propagated from the lower level, and it generates an alarm to report to the operator that the mission is 
over when all of the remaining mission alarms are zero, i.e., when all units have completed their plans. 
Table 4. Fleet-level supervisor alarms. 
Supervisor Alarm Description 
Collision 
Very Close Two units are very close 
Collision Two units are going to collide in the near future 
Free Path 
A unit has been paused due to an impending collision but now has a free 
path to continue. 
Mission Completed Mission Completed All of the units have completed their missions. 
Fleet ALL All of the alarms generated at this level and at lower levels. 
In summary, the fleet supervisor brings together all of the alarms related to the fleet. It is helpful to 
encapsulate all of the supervision in a single supervisor. All of the alarms generated by this supervisor 
are directly connected to the Fault Recovery Module. 
All supervisors were developed into C++ using the Qt libraries [37]. The use of C++ guaranteed a 
fast performance, which is required due to the vast amount of information to be processed; the Qt 
libraries simplified many of the implementation aspects, such as collision detection (using the Qt 
graphics scene package), the internal communication (using the signals/slots methodology) among the 
supervisors and the external communication to other modules (using the Qt socket classes integrated into 
the Qt network package). 
4.2. Fault Recovery Module 
The Fault Recovery Module can initiate actions in the fleet when it receives certain pre-specified 
alarms. For this version of the system, only the alarms generated by the supervisors of the highest level, 
the collision supervisor and the mission completed supervisor, trigger actions. Table 5 summarises the 
actions associated with these alarms. 
Table 5. Alarms and actions associated with the Fault Recovery Module. 
Alarm Action 
Very Close Stop the units involved 
Collision Pause the units involved 
Free Path Resume the unit 
Mission Completed Stop all units in the fleet 
When the units are extremely close to each other, they are directly stopped to avoid potential damage. 
If a near-future collision is detected, the situation is not as dangerous as in the first case (there is more 
reaction time), and thus, a pause is sent. Once the path is free for a paused unit and a free path alarm is 
received, a resume action is sent to the unit. If a mission completed alarm is received, the Fault Recovery 
Module sends a stop to all units, ensuring that the fleet finishes properly. 
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In addition the Mission Supervisor, the Fault Recovery Module was developed using Qt and was 
connected to the Mission Supervisor by the signals/slots methodology to accelerate the interactions 
between both modules. 
4.3. Operator GUI 
The operator GUI was developed using the mobile robotics simulation software Webots 8 [38], which 
is developed using Qt. Thus, the communication between the GUI and the Mission Supervisor modules 
were guaranteed using Qt sockets. 
5. Results and Discussion 
Two different missions were planned to test the supervision system. The first mission was designed 
to check the general behaviour of the supervision system: a single tractor carrying a sprayer boom had 
to cover the crop by applying treatment just on the weed patches. The second mission was designed to 
check the supervision system behaviour when several units are working together, and it was designed to 
validate the Collision Supervisor and Fault Recovery Module: two tractors had to cover the entire field 
and avoid collisions. The missions were executed in the facilities of the Center for Automation and 
Robotics in Madrid (40°18′51.102″N, 3°29′03.379″W). The field was 42.5 m × 41.5 m, and it was 
manually prepared by painting white lines that delimit the simulated weed patches (Figure 5a). Then,  
a weed map was built by using an RTK-GPS receiver to accurately position the borders of the weed 
patches (Figure 5b). Additionally, the four corners of the field were also delimited by white lines. The 
weed map consisted of a matrix in which each cell represents an area of 0.5 m × 0.5 m of the crop; it 
takes a value 1 if there is weed and a value of 0 otherwise. The UCS systems were set to issue monitoring 
messages every 250 ms (4 Hz) for both missions; this frequency was sufficient to control the vehicles if 
they did not exceed 3 km/h. A vehicle moves approximately 0.83 m each second at 3 km/h, i.e., 21 cm 
per message, which is a highly controllable distance, as experimentally proven. The missions were 
executed several times, and the results were similar for all of the attempts. 
  
(a) (b) 
Figure 5. Actual test field and its computer representation. Map of the field and weeds used 
for the tests. The white markings define the areas of weed patches. 
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5.1. One Vehicle Mission 
In this mission, the tractor had to cover the field and apply herbicide only in the appropriate patches. 
Because the patch positions were well known, the mission trajectory, represented in red in Figure 6, was 
designed to cover the entire field and account for the 6 m (12 nozzles) bar that was carried by the tractor. 
On the left side of Figure 6, the black squares show where the nozzles are active, and the grey squares 
indicate inactive nozzles when at least another nozzle in the bar is activated. 
 
Figure 6. Mission trajectory and sprayer boom activation status. 
Figure 7 shows the results obtained for the speed supervisor. The expected working speeds for 
performing the task were 2 km/h in the headlands (during the turning manoeuvres) and 3 km/h inside 
the field. The supervisor was tested with three different error thresholds: 0.5, 1 and 1.5 km/h. The actual 
and expected speeds of the tractor are displayed in red and blue, respectively, at the top of the figure.  
At the bottom, the output alarms generated for the three different speed thresholds are displayed in green. 
The supervisor was initially tested with the smallest speed threshold, 0.5 km/h, and many alarms were 
generated because the vehicle was not able to maintain the requested speeds within such a narrow 
margin. Then, two higher thresholds were tested, 1 and 1.5 km/h, and the alarms generated for these 
cases are displayed just below. In general, the speed supervisor was capable of successfully detecting 
the differences between the actual and expected speeds and generated alarms when the differences were 
larger than the set threshold. 
 
Figure 7. Speed supervisor inputs (real and expected speed) and outputs (alarms). 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 8. Implement supervisor inputs (actual and expected states) and outputs (alarm)  
(a) in the entire mission; and (b) in the mission interval from 283 s to 323 s. 
Figure 8 shows the results for the implement state supervisor for the sprayer boom. Figure 8a shows 
the entire mission, whereas Figure 8b displays only the part of the mission that elapsed from second 283 
to second 322. The actual and expected states of the nozzles are shown in red and blue, respectively, and 
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the alarm activations/deactivations are indicated in green. The status differences were mainly due to the 
delay associated with the response time of the nozzles and were successfully detected by the supervisor. 
Because the supervisor is checking the implement state with a frequency (every 250 ms) higher than the 
nozzles’ response time, an alarm is generated every time the UCS has to activate/deactivate the nozzles. 
These differences are on the order of seconds and occasionally even smaller; thus, distinguishing the 
differences between the expected states and the actual states in Figure 8a is nearly impossible. The nozzle 
states precisely matched the shape of the patches. For example, the large diamond inside the third track 
of the field (refer to Figure 6) can be easily observed near 300 s in both figures. 
Figure 9 shows the results for the out-of-track supervisor. A point is set as visited when the  
distance between the expected and actual positions of the tractor is equal to or less than 10 cm. The 
actual and expected trajectories are shown along the time in red and blue, respectively, and the alarm 
activations/deactivations are indicated in green. Most of the alarms are generated during the turning 
manoeuvres. For the turns, the vehicle accuracy is lower because the wheels are more affected by the 
roughness of the terrain. Furthermore, the minimum turning radius of the vehicle used was 2.89 m,  
and the mission path involved manoeuvres with a turning radius of 3 m, and thus, the turning machinery 
was working under extreme conditions. 
 
Figure 9. Out-of-track supervisor inputs (actual and expected trajectory) and outputs (alarm). 
 
Figure 10. Remaining mission supervisor output. 
Figure 10 shows the results for the remaining mission supervisor. As shown in Figure 9, the tractor 
covered the trajectory quite accurately, and the remaining percentage of the mission can be easily 
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determined by calculating the remaining distance from the current position. The remaining mission 
supervisor succeeded in updating the remaining percentage periodically; this percentage is shown in 
Figure 10. Because the turning manoeuvres were accomplished at a lower speed (2 km/h) than the 
straight lines (3 km/h), the remaining percentage decreased more slowly during the turns; this is why the 
slope is not constant in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 11. Alarms generated by the service disruption supervisor. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 12. Alarms generated by the unit supervisor (a) over time and (b) over the trajectory. 
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Figure 11 shows the results for the service disruption supervisor. This supervisor was set to monitor 
the positions provided by the GPS receivers on the vehicles. Two time thresholds were tested to verify 
whether the messages arrived within a given expected time window: 1 s and 0.5 s. As the monitoring 
rate provided by the UCS was set to 4 Hz, the majority of the monitoring messages were received with 
an interval time of 250 ms, as shown in the figure. In one case, the position was not received for a period 
close to 0.6 s. As this period did not exceed the 1 s threshold, no alarm was generated for that time limit. 
For the remaining time limit of 0.5 s, an alarm was issued near 300 s. 
Finally, Figure 12 shows the unit supervisor, which brings together all of the alarms generated for  
the tested vehicle. The speed alarms displayed were generated when the speed error threshold was set to 
0.5 km/h. There are no service disruption alarms because the time limit was set to 1 s for the test. 
In this case, there is not a fleet; thus, the fleet supervisor is equivalent to the unit supervisor because 
the fleet is composed of only one vehicle. A video describing the mission can be accessed in [39].  
5.2. Fleet Mission 
The second mission was focused on testing the supervisor with several units working together; thus, 
the supervisors that involve several units (specially the collision supervisor) are analysed below.  
A mission with two vehicles turning on the same headlands at the same time was generated. Figure 13 
shows the trajectories of the mission. 
 
Figure 13. Trajectories for the two tractors in the second mission. 
The tractors had to cover the entire field by following parallel trajectories at the same speed, faking 
a spraying treatment; thus, the supervisor was configured to assume that both tractors were carrying 6 m 
spraying booms. Furthermore, the trajectories involved potential collisions during the turns on the 
headlands, as shown in Figures 13 and 14. Figure 13 shows the initial positions, field contours (black 
lines) and trajectories (blue line for vehicle identifies as 2 and green line for vehicle identifies as 3). 
Figure 14 displays the most relevant moments of the mission. At the beginning of the mission (Figure 14a), 
both tractors started moving, but a collision was detected close to the right bottom corner of the field; 
there, both tractors had to turn, and, even if they had not collided, their bars (6 m) would have collided 
during the turn. The width of the tracks that divide the field (delimited in Figure 13 by the black dotted 
lines) is equivalent to the bar length. Moreover, the collision supervisor detects the collisions by 
calculating where the units will be over the mission time, but it considers a surrounding area larger than 
the physical one for security reasons because the tractors cannot be stopped instantaneously. Thus, the 
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supervisor will detect a collision even if there is no real collision but the units move inside this  
safety area. 
 
Figure 14. Mission timeline. (a–l) Collisions dealt with by pause and resume operations, 
and (m–n) final positions of the vehicles. 
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When the first collision was detected (red cross in Figure 14a), the alarm was propagated to the Fault 
Recovery Module, and it forced unit 2 to pause its mission. Unit 3 kept moving; once it moved a 
sufficient distance, the collision supervisor detected a free path for the unit 2 manoeuvre and issued  
a free path alarm. This alarm was processed by the Fault Recovery Module, and it restarted unit 2  
(Figure 14b). According to the initial conditions, if the units kept moving at the same speeds, because 
they are following analogous trajectories, they should not coincide at any point later in the mission. 
However, due to mechanical reasons, unit 3 was considerably slower than the second unit during the 
turn manoeuvres. Thus, tractor 2 reached a new risky position (Figure 14c) and was paused again by the 
Fault Recovery Module. Unit 3 finally finished the turn manoeuvre and moved away, and unit 2 was 
then restarted (Figure 14d). In the second turn of unit 3 (Figure 14e–g), when the unit took so much time 
to drive around the curve, unit 2 had to be stopped twice (it was resumed because the collision supervisor 
calculated the future positions according to the expected speeds, and unit 3 in the expected location). For 
the next two turning manoeuvres, two new collisions were detected (Figure 14i,k). Consequently, unit 2 
was paused; once unit 3 completed the manoeuvres and moved a sufficient distance, unit 2 was restarted 
(Figure 14h,j). Finally, both units finished their missions (Figure 14m,n). Figure 15 shows the internal 
states of the units during the mission as well as the outputs of the collision supervisor. The collisions 
and free path alarms issued by the collision supervisor are displayed in red and green lines, respectively. 
There are six red lines because six collisions were detected (Figure 14a,c,e,g,i,k), and there are six green 
lines because 6 collisions were prevented (Figure 14b,d,f, h,l).  
Unit 3 maintained the same state during the entire mission because the Fault Recovery Module 
decided to pause/resume unit 2 every time. When the first collision was detected, the Fault Recovery 
Module could choose which unit to pause; at this time, both possibilities were available and unit 2 was 
randomly selected as all options were equally advantageous. However, during the remaining collision 
situations, the Fault Recovery Module selected unit 2 as no other option was available; the pausing of 
unit 3 did not prevent the collision. 
Every time a collision was detected, the state of unit 2 changed quickly to the “PausingBySupervisor” 
state and remained there until the pause order was internally processed. It was then changed to the 
“PausedBySupervisor (Stage1)” state. In that state, the unit remained paused until the free path alarm 
was issued, and then, the unit supervisor state reached the “PausedBySupervisor (Stage2)” state. In that 
state, the unit remained paused again, but the supervisor started a countdown of 10 s before resuming 
operation of the unit. These 10 s, which were experimentally determined, were employed to enhance the 
safety conditions that prevent the unit from resuming when it remained in close proximity to the other 
vehicles (the supervisor can detect sufficient room with an accuracy of centimetres). After 10 s, operation 
of the unit was finally resumed, changing nearly immediately to the states “Resuming” and “Moving”. 
A video that describes mission can be accessed in [40]. 
Finally, Figure 16 shows the results for the fleet mission completed by the supervisor. This supervisor 
receives as inputs the alarms generated by the remaining mission supervisors of the vehicles. Because 
both units completed the mission (red signals in the figure), the mission can be considered completed, 
and the supervisor issued the corresponding alarm (in green in the figure) as soon as it received the last 
mission completed signal from a vehicle. 
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Figure 15. Collision supervisor outputs and unit states during the mission. 
 
Figure 16. Fleet mission completed supervisor output (green signal) and inputs (red signals). 
6. Conclusions 
The supervision system that was designed and developed was able to detect different failures, 
including dangerous situations, such as tractor out-of-track positions, inappropriate working speeds, 
incorrect states of the implements and potential collisions between units. The supervision system also 
detects important events, such as the completion of a trajectory and the end of the mission. 
The distributed and multilevel approach is well suited to the distributed nature of the fleet of 
autonomous vehicles. The lowest level of supervision operates inside the units, taking care of the most 
urgent issues. A higher level is in charge of the more complex supervision that involves the entire fleet; 
this level is performed on an external computer that receives all of the information provided by the units 
(so it has a complete overview of the fleet status). The third level allows a human operator to monitor 
the underlying system and take control if needed. The external level is also divided into different  
sub-levels that contain different basic supervisors. The modular and hierarchical architecture has proven 
to be a useful framework for incrementally implementing complex supervisor systems based on  
lower-level and simpler supervisors. Thus, the supervision system could easily be extended to detect any 
type of failure just by adding new low-level supervisors. 
The proposed system successfully performs the three main supervision functions: fault detection, 
fault diagnosis and fault recovery. It can complete these functions for any of its three main levels. 
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Two realistic tests based on real agricultural tasks were designed to test the system, and the supervisor 
succeeded in both tasks with high performance. Thus, the supervision system and architecture are highly 
useful for supervising fleets, particularly fleets of agricultural vehicles. 
In future work, the supervisor could be improved by enhancing the fault recovery functionality, which 
could be accomplished by linking more alarms to the Fault Recovery Module to neutralise more failures. 
In addition, tests with larger fleets should be performed to test the scalability of the system. To date, a 
maximum of three vehicles have been used in real trials. A fleet with more units will provide the system 
with more information to process, and the processing can be a bottleneck because the system operates 
in real time. Finally, some simple constraints could be added to some of the supervisors to avoid alarms 
when they are not clearly needed. For example, the supervisor of the state of the implements could 
account for the delay in the response of the nozzles by allowing for some response time difference. 
Moreover, in some cases, the alarm may be activated/deactivated very often, such as when the speed 
supervisor has a small threshold. For these cases, it could be useful to add a filter in the Alarm 
Notification Manager so as not to overwhelm the operator with redundant information. The study of 
different development options is being planned to achieve a flexible policy system in which the policies 
can be adjusted during runtime, either manually by the operator or automatically, depending on the 
operator’s current workload. 
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